Sunday, April 8, 2007

Letters from Senators

As you learn about Sibel Edmonds' case, many of the strangest things jump out at you. Among those is the fact that much of the information regarding her case was retroactively classified. In other words, it was out there for the public, then the government stepped in and decided it should be classified.

Other things include the fact that Sibel Edmonds is not allowed to testify; she has a gag order placed on her. The gag order references something called "state secrets privelege". In one bizarre episode, she and her attorney were required to leave a courtroom while a judge talked to attorneys for the U.S. Government. When Ms. Edmonds and her attorney were allowed back in, it was to be informed that the judge had ruled in favor of the Government.

Basically, what this amounts to is somebody is trying to sweep something under the rug.

That something is very big.

Consequently, the rug doesn't cover it all that well.

So, when the rug is pulled a little one way to cover one thing up better, something else is uncovered somewhere else.



From Classified Letters Regarding FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds:



19 June 2002 Letter from Sens. Leahy and Grassley to DOJ Inspector General Fine
June 19, 2002

The Honorable Glenn A. Fine
Inspector General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Fine:

The Senate Judiciary Committee has received unclassified information from the FBI regarding allegations made by Ms. Sibel D. Edmonds, a former FBI contract linguist, that your office is currently investigating. We request that, as this investigation progresses, you consider the following questions on this matter:

(1) Ms. Edmonds has alleged, and the FBI has confirmed, that the FBI assigned a contract language "monitor" to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, contrary to clear FBI policy that only more qualified "linguists" be assigned to Guantanamo Bay. What circumstances led to the contract language monitor being considered qualified for this assignment, and what were the consequences, if any, for the effectiveness of the interrogation of those being detained at Guantanamo?

(2) Ms. Edmonds has alleged, and the FBI has confirmed, that another contract linguist in the FBI unit to which Ms. Edmonds was assigned failed to translate at least two communications reflecting a foreign official's handling of intelligence matters. The FBI has confirmed that the contract linguist had "unreported contacts" with that foreign official. To what extent did that contract linguist have any additional unreported or reported contacts with that foreign official? What counterintelligence inquiries or assessments, if any, were made with respect to those contacts? Do you plan to interview field office and headquarters counterintelligence personnel regarding this matter?

(3) The FBI has said that, to review the other contract linguist's work that Ms. Edmonds questioned, it used three linguists in its language division, a supervisory special agent, and special agents who worked on the case that generated the communications under review. Was this a "blind" review by the linguists, or did they know the person whose work was under review? Were the linguists sufficiently independent to make objective judgments about the translations in question? Would it have been appropriate to use linguists from outside the FBI?

(4) The FBI has said a determination was made by the supervisory special agent that the contract linguist whose work was reviewed made a mistake and that the matter was a training issue. Did this agent's position affect his ability to render an objective judgment? What input did the other special agents provide? Did their involvement in the case that generated the communications affect their ability to make an objective judgement about a person with whom they had worked on the case? Would it have been better to ask other counterintelligence agents to assess the importance of the untranslated information and the reason it was not translated?

(5) To what extent is the credibility of witnesses regarding Ms. Edmonds' allegations affected by their continuing employment in the same translation unit and under the same supervisor where the contract linguist discussed in question (2) is employed.

(6) The FBI has said that Ms. Edmonds prepared two classified documents with respect to her allegations on her home computer without authorization and that one witness reported Ms. Edmunds discussed classified information regarding her allegations in the presence of three uncleared members of her family without authorization. Would these actions disqualify her from a security clearance, given the circumstances of her concern about a foreign attempt to penetrate or influence FBI operations at her workplace?

(7) What guidance is provided to FBI contract linguists as to the steps they should take if they are concerned about a possible foreign attempt to penetrate or influence FBI operations? How well is this guidance understood by contract linguists in the FBI translation centers and other FBI personnel who would handle such matters?

(8) What improvements, if any, are needed to encourage FBI contract linguists and other FBI contract personnel to come forward with such counterintelligence concerns and to ensure that they are not adversely affected as a result of seeking to assist FBI counterintelligence efforts? Was Ms. Edmunds' case handled in a manner that would encourage such reporting in the future?

Please let us know the timetable for your investigation and advise us of the results.

Sincerely,

PATRICK LEAHY
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY
United States Senator



13 Aug 2002 Letter from Sens. Leahy and Grassley to Attorney General Ashcroft
August 13, 2002

Hon. John Ashcroft
Attorney General
United States Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear General Ashcroft:

We are writing jointly in order that you might allay our concern about the status of the investigation into allegations made by Sibel Edmonds, a former contract linguist in the Washington Field Office of the FBI. Although we understand that the matter is currently under investigation by the Inspector General, we are troubled that the Department of Justice, including the FBI, may not be acting quickly enough to address the issues raised by Ms. Edmonds' complaints or cooperating fully with the Inspector General's office.

By way of background, Ms. Edmonds first raised concerns about security problems and the integrity of important translations earlier this year. Unfortunately, nearly every person at the FBI who was notified of the situation reacted by questioning why Ms. Edmonds was "causing trouble." Indeed, the FBI's first internal security action in this case focused on Ms. Edmonds, instead of the allegations that she raised in good faith as a whistleblower and which bore on national security and the war against terrorism.

Ms. Edmonds has made a number of serious allegations, some of which the FBI verified during an unclassified briefing for Judiciary Committee staff on June 17. First, Ms. Edmonds has alleged that a contract monitor in her unit ("monitor") chose not to translate important, intelligence-related information, instead limiting her translation to unimportant and innocuous information. The FBI has verified that this monitor indeed failed to translate intelligence-related information, but has attributed the failure to a lack of training as opposed to a malicious act.

That conclusion is directly related to Ms. Edmond's second allegation. Ms. Edmonds alleged that the same contract monitor once worked for an organization associated with the target of a counter-intelligence investigation and that the monitor had unreported contacts with a foreign national who was a member of the target institution. Additionally, Ms. Edmonds states that some of the mistranslated recordings on which the monitor actually worked contained conversations by this same foreign national with whom the monitor had such contacts. Finally, the foreign national disclosed in recorded conversations that he handled intelligence matters. This fact was among the information that was not translated or summarized by the monitor.

Even after verifying these allegations, the FBI downplayed the importance of this matter and seemed to imply that it had ceased looking into the complaints as a security matter until after the Inspector General Office finishes its investigation. Anyone who remembers the long-time treachery of former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen would be concerned at this reaction. For years, Hanssen's bizarre actions were also written off as minor security breaches and unworthy of serious consideration. If even routine diligence had been exercised earlier, Hanssen could have been stopped from doing untold damage. The FBI needs to learn from its mistakes.

In addition to general concerns raised by this case, we have several specific concerns we wish to raise for your review. First, we have learned that a person central to the investigation -- the monitor referred to earlier -- will be leaving the country in early September, which most likely will be before the investigation is resolved. If you or your staff would like to know the identity of the monitor, please contact Inspector General Fine's office, with whom Senator Grassley's staff has been in touch. The monitor may hold dual citizenship with the United States and a foreign country and may possess a valid passport issued by that foreign country. Thus, there will be little or no assurance that the monitor will return or cooperate with an investigation in the future. Based on these facts, we would like your assurance that you are satisfied that there has been and will be no delay that will prejudice, in any way, the outcome of this investigation.

Furthermore, we would like your assurance that the Department of Justice, including the FBI, will fully cooperate in all aspects of the inquiry. For instance, we draw your attention to the fact that the FBI currently opposes depositions of the monitor and her husband as part of the investigation into this case. The FBI takes this position despite the fact that the monitor is no longer employed by the FBI, that the monitor's husband never worked at the FBI and even though the military agency that employs the monitor's husband does not oppose a deposition. Moreover, we understand that the monitor and her husband have signed a letter stating they will make themselves available for depositions. It is unclear, then, why the FBI is taking this position in the wake of such important allegations bearing on national security. We hope that you will ensure that the FBI is fully compliant with the Inspector General's inquiry as it proceeds.

Finally, we are concerned about the most crucial evidence in the case -- the recordings that were allegedly improperly translated. Because these bear directly on the veracity of Ms. Edmonds' allegations, we seek your assurance that the recordings will be properly maintained, turned over to the Inspector General's Office and promptly translated by a competent and independent authority. That way the validity of the complaint can be quickly evaluated.

We know that you share our concern that the FBI address issues bearing on national security in a prompt manner, regardless of whether or not they cast the FBI in a positive light. Only by honest evaluation can the FBI learn from its past mistakes. We thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter. We request a reply in writing by Wednesday, August 28, 2002.

Sincerely,

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy

Sen. Chuck Grassley
Chairman, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs



28 Oct 2002 Press Release and Letter from Sen. Grassley to FBI Director Mueller
For Immediate Release
Monday, October 28, 2002

Grassley Seeks Overhaul of FBI's Translation Unit
Iowa Senator Cites High Stakes in War on Terrorism

WASHINGTON — Sen. Chuck Grassley has asked the FBI Director to conduct a top-to-bottom review and to arrange an independent examination of the FBI's translation capabilities given the importance of accurate and timely translations to homeland security and the war on terrorism.

Grassley made his request following a story broadcast last night on CBS' 60 Minutes featuring the testimony of Sibel Edmonds, an FBI whistleblower who lost her job as a translator after raising questions about problems within the translation unit at FBI headquarters in Washington.

Grassley is the ranking member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs. He is an outspoken watchdog of the FBI, where he has pushed for numerous reforms since 1996. Here is a copy of Grassley's letter to Mueller.

October 28, 2002
The Honorable Robert Mueller
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Mueller:

I am writing to you about my concern with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's translation capabilities.

I believe it would be prudent for you to arrange for an independent audit and general review of the FBI's translation units, particularly at the Washington Field Office.

A review team with members from the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and military branches should conduct a top-to-bottom examination of the FBI's translation units for performance issues such as timeliness, efficiency, accuracy and management.

I make this request for several reasons.

First, the FBI's translation capabilities are crucial to the war on terrorism, particularly preventing attacks. Translations provide essential intelligence to agents investigating suspected terrorists.

Second, numerous reports have documented problems with the FBI's translation capabilities. These reports, by organizations such as the General Accounting Office and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, highlight shortages in qualified and proficient translators.

Third, I am not entirely confident in information that FBI officials have provided to the Judiciary Committee to the effect that translation issues are no longer a problem. At a June 17, 2002 briefing regarding the case of Sibel Edmonds, FBI officials stated that the bureau was nearly finished with translating existing documents. Am I to believe that the FBI has translated all existing foreign language documents and conducted analysis of the information?

I am also concerned about how long it takes to translate documents and recordings. The FBI in most cases does not know what it's listening to and thus cannot prioritize the translation. So if agents have a recording of terrorists planning an impending attack, the translation may come too late.

I understand that Ms. Edmonds' case remains under investigation by the Justice Department Inspector General. Regardless of that specific case, however, it is clear not only from her information but from other government agencies that the FBI's translation capabilities need improvement.

Translation capabilities depend on more than just sheer numbers. Operating rules, guidelines and protocols for translation practices and accuracy are just as important, if not more so, for the FBI to conduct a successful war on terrorism and to protect the nation from future attacks.

I would appreciate a reply with a statement of your intentions to this regard by Monday, November 25, 2002. Thank you.

Sincerely,
Chuck Grassley
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs

Here is the complete transcript [I editted out small parts not related to Sibel Edmonds' story -- Y.D.] of the CBS 60 Minutes story from Sunday evening, Oct. 27, 2002:

Copyright 2002 Burrelle's Information Services
CBS News Transcripts
SHOW: 60 Minutes (7:00 PM ET) - CBS
October 27, 2002 Sunday
TYPE: Leads LENGTH: 384 words
HEADLINE: 60 Minutes

BODY:

CO-HOSTS: Mike Wallace, Morley Safer, Ed Bradley, Steve Kroft, Lesley Stahl

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Don Hewitt

(Footage of Sibel Edmonds sitting at desk; Edmonds walking with Ed Bradley; Senator Charles Grassley and Bradley)

ED BRADLEY: (Voiceover) She lost her job at the FBI when she charged that people she worked with were more interested in budget concerns than in capturing terrorists. Before telling us the details, she told them to, among others, Senator Charles Grassley, who sits on the Judiciary Committee that oversees the FBI.

Did she seem credible to you? Did her story seem credible? Senator CHARLES GRASSLEY (Republican, Iowa): Absolutely, she's credible. And the reason I feel she's very credible is because people within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.

(Footage of Edmonds)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) And her story is our lead story tonight.

[ ... ]

WALLACE: I'm Mike Wallace.

MORLEY SAFER: I'm Morley Safer.

BRADLEY: I'm Ed Bradley.

STEVE KROFT: I'm Steve Kroft.

STAHL: I'm Lesley Stahl. Those stories and Andy Rooney, tonight on 60 MINUTES.

(Announcements)

Copyright 2002 Burrelle's Information Services

CBS News Transcripts

SHOW: 60 Minutes (7:00 PM ET) - CBS

October 27, 2002 Sunday

TYPE: Profile

LENGTH: 2328 words

HEADLINE: Lost in translation; former FBI translator accuses bureau of intentionally not doing its work in translating documents

ANCHORS: ED BRADLEY

BODY:

LOST IN TRANSLATION

ED BRADLEY, host:

Lost in Translation is the story of hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign language documents that the FBI neglected to translate before and after September 11th because of problems in its language department, documents that detailed what the FBI heard on wiretaps and learned during interrogations of suspected terrorists. Sibel Edmonds, a translator who worked at the FBI's language division, says the documents weren't translated because the division is riddled with incompetence and corruption. Edmonds was fired after reporting her concerns to FBI officials. She recently told her story behind closed doors to investigators in Congress and to the Justice Department. Tonight she tells her story to us.

(Footage of Edmonds and Bradley; FBI agents carrying boxes out of house; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Because she is fluent in Turkish and other Middle Eastern languages, Edmonds, a 32-year-old Turkish-American, was hired by the FBI soon after September 11th and given top-secret security clearance to translate some of the reams of documents seized by FBI agents who, for the past year, have been rounding up suspected terrorists across the United States and abroad. Ms. SIBEL EDMONDS: The first two months after the September 11 event, we--the agents out there in--in--in New York, LA, other field offices, they were working around the clock. And I would receive calls from these people saying, 'Would you please prioritize this and--and translate it?'

(Footage of Edmonds sitting at desk; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) But Edmonds says that to her amazement, from the day she started the job, she was told repeatedly by one of her supervisors that there was no urgency; that she should take longer to translate documents so that the department would appear overworked and understaffed. That way, it would receive a larger budget for the next year.

Ms. EDMONDS: We were told by our supervisors that this was the great opportunity for asking for increased budget and asking for more translators. And in order to do that, don't do the work and let the documents pile up so we can show it and say that we need more translators and expand the department.

BRADLEY: So you--you have FBI agents who are in the field relying on your translation work in order to move their cases forward, and your supervisor is saying, 'Slow down. Let the cases pile up'?

Ms. EDMONDS: Correct.

BRADLEY: I mean, how is it possible that the focus wasn't on terrorism, particularly after 9/11?

Ms. EDMONDS: It was not. At least in that department, it was not.

(Footage of Bradley and Edmonds)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Edmonds says that the supervisor, in an effort to slow her down, went so far as to erase completed translations from her FBI computer after she'd left work for the day.

Ms. EDMONDS: The next day, I would come to work, turn on my computer and the work would be gone. The translation would be gone. Then I had to start all over again and retranslate the same document. And I went to my supervisor and he said, 'Consider it a lesson and don't talk about it to anybody else and don't mention it.'

BRADLEY: What's the lesson?

Ms. EDMONDS: The lesson was don't work, don't do the translations. Go out and spend two hours lunch breaks, you know. Go and--don't go and get coffee downstairs. Go eight blocks away. Just chat with your friends. But don't do the work because--and this is our chance to increase the number of people here in this department.

(Footage of Edmonds sitting at desk; Grassley speaking at podium; Grassley and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Sibel Edmonds put her concerns about the FBI's language department in writing to her immediate superiors and to a top official at the FBI. Edmonds says for months, she got no response. She then turned for help to the Justice Department's inspector general, which is investigating her claims, and to Senator Charles Grassley because his committee, the Judiciary Committee, has direct oversight of the FBI.

Did she seem credible to you? Did her story seem credible?

Senator CHARLES GRASSLEY (Republican, Iowa): Absolutely, she's credible. And the reason I feel she's very credible is because people within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.

(Footage of woman working at computer; Kevin Taskasen speaking with woman; prisoners at Guantanamo Bay; Taskasen; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) The FBI has conceded that some people in the language department are unable to adequately speak English or the language they're supposed to be translating. Kevin Taskasen was assigned to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to translate interrogations of Turkish-speaking al-Qaida members who had been captured after September 11th. The FBI admits that he was not fully qualified to do the job.

Ms. EDMONDS: He neither passed the English nor the Turkish side of this language proficiency test.

BRADLEY: So that means if, for example, you had a--a terrorist detained at--at Guantanamo who had information about an attack being planned in the future against the United States, that person would not have been in a position to translate that?

Ms. EDMONDS: Correct. He wouldn't.

BRADLEY: I mean, that's hard to imagine.

Ms. EDMONDS: But that's the case.

(Footage of exterior of J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building; recovery effort at World Trade Center bombing in 1993; exterior of FBI Building; recovery effort at World Trade Center bombing in 2001; GAO documents on foreign languages; Grassley and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Critical shortages of experienced Middle Eastern language translators have plagued the FBI and the rest of the US intelligence community for years. Months before the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, one of the plotters of the attack was heard on tape having a discussion in Arabic that no one at the time knew was about how to make explosives, and he had a manual that no one at the time knew was about how to blow up buildings. None of it was translated until well after the bombing, and while the FBI has hired more translators since then, officials concede that problems in the language division have hampered the country's efforts to battle terrorism, and according to congressional investigators, may have played a role in the inability to prevent the September 11th attacks. Earlier this year, the General Accounting Office reported that the FBI had expressed concern over the thousands of hours of audiotapes and pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated because of a lack of qualified linguists.

Sen. GRASSLEY: If--If they got word today that within--in a little while, the Hoover Dam was going to be blown up, and it takes a week or two to get it translated, as was one of the problems in this department, you know, you couldn't intervene to prevent that from happening.

BRADLEY: So you think that this place does need an overhaul essentially?

Sen. GRASSLEY: It needs to be turned upside down.

(Footage of exterior of FBI Building; FBI agent; foreign flags; Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) In its rush to hire more foreign language translators after September 11th, the FBI admits it has had difficulty performing background checks to detect translators who may have loyalties to other governments, which could pose a threat to US national security.

Take the case of Jan Dickerson, a Turkish translator who worked with Sibel Edmonds. The FBI has admitted that when Dickerson was hired last November, the bureau didn't know that she had worked for a Turkish organization being investigated by the FBI's own counterintelligence unit, and they didn't know...

(Footage of Turkish Embassy; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) ...she'd had a relationship with a Turkish intelligence officer stationed in Washington who was the target of that investigation. According to Sibel Edmonds, Jan Dickerson tried to recruit her into that organization, and insisted that Dickerson be the only one to translate the FBI's wiretaps of that Turkish official.

What was her reaction when you didn't go along with--with her plan?

Ms. EDMONDS: She got very angry, and later she threatened me and my family's life.

BRADLEY: Threatened you?

Ms. EDMONDS: Correct.

BRADLEY: Did--did you take her threat seriously?

Ms. EDMONDS: Oh, yes. She said, 'Why would you want to place your life and your family's life in danger by translating these tapes?'

(Footage of Edmonds working at desk; State Department building; aerial view of the Pentagon; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Edmonds says that when she reviewed Dickerson's translations of those tapes, she found that Dickerson had left out information crucial to the FBI's investigation; information that Edmonds says would have revealed that the Turkish intelligence officer had spies working for him inside the US State Department and at the Pentagon.

Ms. EDMONDS: We came across at least 17, 18 translations, communications that were extremely important for--for the ongoing investigations of these indivi--individuals.

BRADLEY: And she had not translated these--these--this information?

Ms. EDMONDS: No, she had marked it as 'not important to be translated.'

BRADLEY: Specifically, what kind of information did she leave out of her translation?

Ms. EDMONDS: Activities to obtain the United States military and intelligence secrets.

(Edmonds working; Edmonds and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Edmonds says she complained repeatedly to her bosses about what she'd found on the wiretaps and about Jan Dickerson's conduct, but that nobody at the FBI wanted to hear about it. She says not even the assistant special agent in charge.

Ms. EDMONDS: He said, 'Do you realize what you are saying here in your allegations? Are you telling me that our security people are not doing their jobs? Is that what you're telling me? If you insist on this investigation, I'll make sure in no time it will turn around and become an investigation about you.' These were his exact words.

(Footage of FBI letter to Edmonds; Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Sibel Edmonds was fired this past March. The FBI offered no explanation, saying in the letter only that her contract was terminated completely for the government's convenience.

But three months later, the FBI conceded that on at least two occasions, Jan Dickerson had, in fact, left out significant information from her translations. They say it was due to a lack of experience and was not malicious.

(Footage of exterior of home; Chicago Tribune article; Grassley and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Dickerson recently quit the FBI and now lives in Belgium. She declined to be interviewed, but two months ago, she told the Chicago Tribune that the allegations against her are preposterous and ludicrous. Senator Charles Grassley says he's disturbed by what the Dickerson incident says about internal security at the FBI.

Sen. GRASSLEY: You shouldn't have somebody in your organization that's compromising our national security by not doing the job right, whether it's a lack of skills or whether it's intentional.

BRADLEY: Based on your experience, does the Sibel Edmonds case fall into any pattern of behavior, pattern of conduct on--on the part of the FBI?

Sen. GRASSLEY: The usual pattern. Let me tell you, first of all, the embarrassing information comes out, the FBI reaction is to sweep it under the rug, and then eventually they shoot the messenger.

(Footage of John Roberts leaving building; Roberts and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Special agent John Roberts, a chief of the FBI's Internal Affairs Department, agrees. And while he is not permitted to discuss the Sibel Edmonds case, for the last 10 years, he has been investigating misconduct by FBI employees and says he is outraged by how little is ever done about it.

Mr. JOHN ROBERTS: I don't know of another person in the FBI who has done the internal investigations that I have and has seen what I have and that knows what has occurred and what has been glossed over and what has, frankly, just disappeared, just vaporized, and no one disciplined for it.

(Footage of Robert Mueller speaking at podium; Roberts; Edmonds working; Roberts and Bradley)

BRADLEY: (Voiceover) Despite a pledge from FBI director Robert Mueller to overhaul the culture of the FBI in light of 9/11, and encourage bureau employees to come forward to report wrongdoing, Roberts says that in the rare instances when employees are disciplined, it's usually low-level employees like Sibel Edmonds who get punished and not their bosses.

Mr. ROBERTS: I think the double standard of discipline will continue no matter who comes in, no matter who tries to change. You--you have a certain--certain group that--that will continue to protect itself. That's just how it is.

BRADLEY: No matter what happens?

Mr. ROBERTS: I would say no matter what happens.

BRADLEY: Have you found cases since 9/11 where people were involved in misconduct and were not, let alone reprimanded, but were even promoted?

Mr. ROBERTS: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

BRADLEY: That's astonishing.

Mr. ROBERTS: Why?

BRADLEY: Because you--you would think that after 9/11, that's a big slap on the face. 'Hello! This is a wake-up call here.'

Mr. ROBERTS: Depends on who you are. If you're in the senior executive level, it may not hurt you. You will be promoted.

BRADLEY: In fact, the supervisor who Sibel Edmonds says told her to slow down her translations was recently promoted. Edmonds has filed a whistle-blower suit to get her job back, but last week, US Attorney General Ashcroft asked the court to dismiss it on grounds it would compromise national security. And also on the grounds of national security, the FBI declined to discuss the specifics of her charges, but it says it takes all such charges seriously and investigates them.

(Announcements)

LOAD-DATE: October 28, 2002


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